Halakhah sobre II Samuel 1:28

A confession of guilt is not admissible as evidence before a Jewish court. Whether or not a confession is admissible and constitutes sufficient grounds for conviction in Noachide courts is a matter of considerable dispute. The thirteenth-century authority, R. Aaron ha-Levi of Barcelona, Sefer ha-Hinnukh, no. 26, rules that a confession of guilt is sufficient for conviction under Noachide law. There is, however, no reference whatsoever to acceptance of a confession of guilt by a Noachide court either in the Talmud or in Rambam's Mishneh Torah.⁶Cf., the interesting comments of R. Yechiel Ya‘akov Weinberg, Seridei Esh, II, no. 104, regarding the possible positions of Rambam and Radbaz. Rashi, in his commentary to II Samuel 1:16, explains that the Amalekite lad who reported that he had killed King Saul was summarily executed because he stood convicted "by his own mouth." Assuming that the term "ger" used in describing the Amalekite lad is, in this instance, to be translated as "stranger" rather than as "proselyte,"⁷See the commentaries of Ralbag and Malbim on II Samuel 1:16; see also Torah Temimah, Genesis 9:5. Cf., Rambam, Hilkhot Sanhedrin 18:6 who expressly refers to the lad as a proselyte. See also the interesting comments of R. Shimon Moshe Diskin, Mas’et ha-Melekh al ha-Rambam (Jerusalem, 5736), no. 273 and idem, Ohel Yehoshu‘a al ha-Torah (Jerusalem, 5738), p. 61, who suggests that the term ger denotes a ger toshav. Citing R. Yitzchak Ze’ev Soloveitchik, Ḥiddushei ha-Riz al ha-Rambam, p. 164, who maintains that a ger toshav who subsequently renounces his acceptance of the Seven Commandments reverts to his former status, Rabbi Diskin asserts that the Amalekite’s declaration that he had slain Saul constituted such a renunciation and hence he reverted to the status of an Amalekite and was put to death on that account. Rashi's comment is in agreement with the position of Sefer ha-Hinnukh. Torah Temimah, Genesis 9:5, finds a source for this position in the Palestinian Talmud, Kiddushin 1:1, but indicates that the meaning of the text is not entirely clear. In his opinion, it is this textual ambiguity which accounts for the conflicting views with regard to the acceptance of a confession by Noachide courts.

Ritva questions how it was possible for Rabbi Eleazar ben Shimon to pass judgment without testimony of witnesses or prior warning and how it was possible for him to do so in a historical epoch in which the Sanhedrin no longer existed. Ritva explains that Rabbi Eleazar ben Shimon was the agent of the king and that the king may rightfully execute evildoers even in the absence of prior admonition and without the benefit of the testimony of two eyewitnesses.¹³See R. Benjamin Rabinowitz-Teumim, Ha-Torah ve-ha-Medinah, IV, 80, who notes that R. Eleazar ben Shimon acted in an official capacity and, even according to Ritva, only a person specifically delegated by the monarch to perform such functions may deliver a criminal into the hands of civil authorities. Ritva further points to the extrajudicial execution of the Amalekite proselyte by King David, recorded in II Samuel 1:15, as an example of punishment on the basis of administration of "the King's justice." Thus Ritva explicitly states that, according to Rabbi Eleazar ben Shimon, even non-Jewish monarchs are authorized to administer extrastatutory punishment in accordance with "the King's justice."